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CHAPTER 4
The Use of Evidence in Health Policy 
in Ghana: Implications for Accountability 
and Democratic Governance
Elisa Vecchione and Justin Parkhurst
IntroductIon
This chapter explores some of the governmental implications of particular 
uses of policy relevant data and evidence for health policymaking in Ghana. 
In particular it looks beyond issues of technical capacity to include issues 
of political responsibility—namely responsibility to use evidence, to take it 
into account, and to account for it. It is worth noting that claims that 
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evidence can improve accountability practices and democratic decisions 
are seen within some current calls for ‘evidence-based policymaking’ 
(EBPM) (c.f: Weisburd and Neyroud 2011; Clarence 2002), but the way 
such improvement should occur remains vague and under-investigated. 
From a general decision-making perspective, the use of evidence serves to 
inform decisions and to make them more ‘rational’. In addition, explicit 
use of evidence potentially improves transparency and along with it the 
accountability of decisions. However, accountability is not an inherent 
property of decisions. It is a practice put into being by policy agents and 
procedures.
This chapter uses a case study of Ghana in order to explore how uses of 
evidence for national planning link with concepts of accountability, and 
what political effects particular uses of evidence can produce. The analysis 
focuses on a specific stage of the policy cycle, namely the evaluation pro-
cess of health policies and programs. Policy evaluation has indeed been 
assigned an ever important role in policymaking through the idea that 
decisions are ‘better’ when they can be tested (Weiss 1999). Under this 
view, policy evaluation combines governance needs for more efficient pol-
icy outcomes with legitimacy quests for more democratic decision pro-
cesses and outcomes. Evidence plays a prominent role in enabling such 
tests and validating decisions according to their outcomes. Indeed, the 
mechanisms by which evidence from evaluation systems work to inform 
future policy choices can be seen as a process by which technical measure-
ments of policy achievements take on political value in shaping policy 
directions. But questions remain about how such translation occurs in 
practice; and how it connects concepts of efficient and legitimate policy-
making. These are important questions which can be obscured by the 
apolitical calls for ‘evidence use’ in policymaking. In this chapter, the term 
‘evaluation’ principally refers to data related to performance monitoring, 
but also refers to how such data are used to evaluate policy choices as well.
As a parliamentary democracy and an aid-recipient country,1 Ghana 
provides an interesting arena in which to investigate the democratic impli-
cations of evidence use in policymaking, namely by applying the concerns, 
which have traditionally been applied to more high-income countries, 
over the expansion of expert-based decision-making structures outside 
1 A recent estimate from the U.S. Global Health Initiative in Ghana shows that 40% of the 
national budget comes from development assistance (available at http://www.ghi.gov/
wherewework/docs/ghanastrategy.pdf).
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national polities (Barnett and Finnemore 1999) and the  consequent bal-
ance between governance improvements and legitimacy decisions.
In order to investigate the practical applications of evidence use in pol-
icy evaluation in Ghana, and its links to accountability, this paper com-
bines theoretical and empirical considerations as follows: First, we briefly 
review theoretical arguments drawn from public administration and policy 
studies to understand how the concepts of accountability and evidence use 
have been associated in governance and policymaking studies. We then 
investigate such association through empirical analysis of health policy in 
Ghana. Finally, we discuss the theoretical contributions in light of both 
our empirical findings and sociological approaches to policymaking.
Our empirical analysis is principally informed by a set of 24 in-depth 
interviews following a semi-structured approach, conducted in 2014 with 
a set of stakeholders in Ghanaian health policy—including representatives 
of the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ghana Health Service (GHS), 
international development partners (DP), local nongovernment organiza-
tions (LNGOs), and members of parliament (MP). When specific inter-
viewees are cited in this paper, they are designated by an anonymous 
number and one of these acronyms. The interviews aimed to understand 
the institutional role and position of each interviewee with respect to 
other actors in the health sector, as well as their perception and under-
standing of evidence use in health policymaking. Data analysis partly ben-
efitted from the use of qualitative tools, such coding using the Nvivo 
qualitative software package, and from the triangulation with other sources 
of data including official documents.
Evaluation and Accountability Within a Policy Space
In its simplest form, accountability links the capacity to evaluate decision 
outcomes to the idea of controlling political agency (Dubnick and 
Frederickson 2011). As per the principal-agent model, the elected principal 
confers the delegated administrative ‘agent’ the power to apply directives, 
while endowing the agent with a margin of discretion. Hence, the need to 
oversee her decisions by making the agent accountable for them (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1991). In principle, evidence helps operationalize account-
ability rules: by informing decisions within the range of discretion that 
authorities have over decisions, and by defining the legitimacy of 
decisions.
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Under this conceptualization of accountability and evidence use, the 
process of evaluating decisions becomes more than a simple managerial or 
technical function. Rather, evaluation evidence serves as a powerful tool 
for testing the achievement of policy objectives, directing policy discus-
sions, validating a particular policy strategy, and rewarding it by allocating 
more funds or prolonging its life cycle. However, the contribution of evi-
dence to accountability depends on the extent to which evidence also 
exposes decisions to judgment and contestation (Heidelberg 2015).
Precisely for these reasons of multiple functionality of evidence use, it is 
critical to analyze how pieces of evidence shift from being used for simple 
technical measurement, to more normative judging (valuation) of policy. 
Applying an institutional lens, however, means that we are particularly 
interested in how this shift can often occur within a specific policy space 
created by formalized evaluation processes. These insights provide a 
framework in which we can analyze how the policy evaluation process 
provides space for participation and contestation among stakeholders over 
the use of evidence to judge policy value. It further allows reflection on 
how rules of accountability within those evaluation processes serve to 
establish power relations and set the spaces through which such contesta-
tion takes place.
EvIdEncE and HEaltH SEctor aSSESSmEnt In GHana
Ghana is a lower-middle income country located in Western Africa. It is 
often considered one of the more democratic and developed of Sub- 
Saharan African nations, but it still suffers from significant resource limita-
tions. The structure of the health system in Ghana follows the basics of 
functional separation between decision making and implementation in 
policymaking (Cassels 1995). Due to concerns over efficiency, some func-
tions traditionally concentrated in the MoH were delegated to technical 
agencies benefitting from a certain degree of independence from govern-
ment and discretion. The GHS is an autonomous Executive Agency of the 
MoH and represents one of the most important policy implementation 
bodies in the health sector, responsible for managing and operating all 
public health facilities and tasked with planning, implementation, moni-
toring and performance assessment of health programmes and services 
(Adjei 2003). The GHS has considerable power in the health sector. It was 
set upon the managerial objective of improving service delivery in Ghana, 
namely by deconcentrating the vertical structure of programs under the 
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MoH (e.g., HIV, TBA, etc.) into local units of management and 
 implementation (Cassels and Janovsky 1992). In practice, however, the 
GHS provides a parallel structure of hierarchical governance (Cassels and 
Janovsky 1992) serving the broader political objective of bringing coher-
ence into the health system.
The Health Information Management Department (HIMD) of the 
Policy, Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation (PPME) division was estab-
lished within the GHS as the focal unit responsible for the collection, 
analysis, reporting, and presentation of health service information (Adjei 
2003). Regional and the District level offices were established with each 
having their own Health Administrations (RHAs and DHAs) and each 
should report to the higher hierarchical level (Adjei 2003) (see Fig. 4.1) 
(Couttolenc 2012). In spite of some problems—e.g. overlapping respon-
sibilities at times emerging across managerial units and local political 
authorities (Couttolenc 2012),2 a fairly well formalized structure of 
accountability exists (within the GHS and between the GHS and the 
MoH), integrated with a systematic practice of reporting and reviewing 
performances of implementation policies, as widely acknowledged by our 
interviewees at the GHS.
The connection between evidence use and accountability in the Ghana 
health system can be seen in the integration of the Health Information 
Management Department (HIMD) within this national system of account-
ability. The HIMD’s specific task is to gather health information such as 
administrative, demographic, and clinical data—typically collected through 
desk review, although sometimes accompanied by interviews (Zakariah 
2014). This is fed upwards from facility to district to region and, ulti-
mately, to central health management levels in order to inform health sec-
tor performances (for more details see Ghana Health Service 2012, p. 30). 
The Centre for Health Information Management within the HIMD col-
lects the data from the district level through the software called the District 
Health Information Management Information System, and then sends it 
to the regional level. The aim of this procedure is to collect information 
2 Confusion and overlapping responsibilities are mainly due to the fact that the deconcen-
tration of health services as under the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act 525 
of 1996, has not yet produced full delegation of power to the local assemblies representing 
the political authority at the district level as in the Local Government Act 462 of 1993 
(Couttolenc 2012). For instance, one local key informant explained that, as consequence of 
incomplete decentralization, there exists a dual hierarchy in the lines of accountability of the 
DHA, which has to report back to both the district assembly and to the regional director.
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from the district up to the national level in order to support each Ministerial 
Agency within the health sector—not only the GHS—with the implemen-
tation of their respective strategies established in their ‘Programmes of 
Work’ (POWs). Each Agency assesses its progress in implementing the 
POWs through an in-house Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) plan, which 
relies on the information produced by the HIMD. The results of M&E 
outcomes should finally converge each year into the Interagency/Health 
Sector Performance Review.
Therefore, a combined mechanism of information diffusion and evalu-
ation of performance exists in Ghana that ties the health governance struc-
ture into a system based on a structured review process: operating internally 
at each administrative level and vertically between district, regional, and 
headquarter managers via peer-review meetings.
accountabIlIty, EvaluatIon and PowEr 
In GHanaIan HEaltH PolIcy
In addition to the process described above combining information and 
evaluation within the Ghanaian hierarchy, a ‘Holistic Assessment tool’ has 
been developed to guide interagency performance review. The Holistic 
Assessment tool was established within the framework of the Common 
Management Arrangement (CMA), which governs and set the rules for 
partnership between the MoH and international donors.
As we will discuss, the tool functions as interface between the MoH, 
responsible for the health sector performance, and international donor 
agencies, which demand accountability of performances to the MoH.
The CMA was conceived to address the problem of parallel donor systems 
and increased aid transaction costs. Now in its third iteration (CMA III), the 
CMA itself was originally introduced in 1997 with the national health sector 
reform of decentralizing service delivery—the creation of the GHS being 
one of the main outcomes—under the sponsorship of the World Health 
Organization (Ghana Health Sector 2012, p.  5). A health- sector- wide 
approach was established along with a pooled funding account of donor 
funds managed by the MoH (Pallas et al. 2015). The method to govern this 
new framework of collaboration was the Holistic Assessment (IHP+ 2003).
The use of sector-wide indicators, milestones, and targets are a key com-
ponent of the Holistic Assessment tool. These are established at the national 
level within the four-year Health Sector Medium Term Development Plan 
(HSMTDP) and are (re-)formulated each year with the programme of 
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work (POW) that the MoH prepares in line with the objectives of the 
national health strategy as set in the HSMTDP.3 Milestones, targets, and 
indicators at the local level are derived from national equivalents. The data 
generated by the HIMD from the district to the national level are devoted 
to fill sector-wide indicators specified in the HSMTDP from which health 
sector agencies draw their own POWs and implementation strategies 
(Nyonator et al. 2014). Targets, are negotiated between the GHS and rel-
evant decentralized bodies to administer DPs’ funds across the national, 
regional and district level.4
The Holistic Assessment tool is also used by international partners to 
assess health sector performances. Thus, international donors are involved 
in the process of selecting indicators, targets and milestones. Information 
appears to indicate that performance indicators get established and revised 
each November of the year during the Business Meeting between the MoH 
and DP (Ghana Health Sector 2012).5 Based on these indicators, the 
Holistic Assessment reports a score for each health sector objective estab-
lished within the annual POW, e.g., bridging equity gaps in health care, 
improving efficiency, and effectiveness in the health system. A score of +1 
is attributed if the indicator has attained the set target, 0 if it just show a 
good trend, −1 if the target has been missed (IHP+ 2003, pp. 37–38).
Interviews conducted with both administrative officials of the MoH 
and DP confirmed that, besides the senior managers meeting at the GHS, 
the main venue for research dissemination and discussion of evidence was 
3 The HSMTDP is prepared by the MoH and its Ministries, Departments, and Agencies 
under the guidance of the National Development Commission and sets the objectives of the 
national health strategy over a period of four years.
4 There are several Budget and Management Centres spread throughout the three admin-
istrative and facility levels. The headquarters of the GHS is managed as one of them; 10 
Regional Health Administration, 8 Regional Hospitals, 110 District Health Administrations, 
and 95 District Hospitals (GHS, available at http://www.ghanahealthservice.org/ghs-sub-
category.php?cid=&scid=43).
5 There are three business meetings. The business meeting during the April health summit 
will assess the sector Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) to feed into the Multi-
Donor Budget Support dialogue. The second business meeting in August will review the 
sector’s progress from the beginning of the year to date and provide an opportunity to table 
new issues. The business meeting in November will be devoted to planning and budgeting. 
The meeting will discuss and agree on health sector plans and associated budget for the ensu-
ing year. It will also agree on indicators for the PAF based on the sector program that was 
presented and discussed. Finally, and “Aide Memoire” will be signed by the Ministry of 
Health and representatives of Development Partners that records the decisions taken during 
the business meeting of November.
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the Health Summit—the annual meeting in which DP and government 
discussed the Holistic Assessment of the health sector (Interviews MoH- 
1, DP-1, DP-2, DP-3). Indeed, according to one MoH official, the Health 
Summit is “the key policymaking structure within the sector” (MoH-1). 
The presentation of the Holistic Assessment to the Health Summit is to 
provide the mechanism for all sector partners to review performance and 
assess the level of compliance with the CMA. However, this mechanism of 
data utilisation serves another purpose besides coordination between dif-
ferent levels of health system governance: it makes the system evaluable by 
external reviewers. However, the CMA clearly states that the use of the 
Holistic Assessment tool should be made “in line with the principles of 
mutual accountability” between the MoH and the donors (Ghana Health 
Sector 2012, p.  7—emphasis added) showing that the Health Summit 
represents not only an additional venue of evaluation, but also an addi-
tional system of accountability in which the MoH is accountable to DP for 
the overall performance of the health sector.
The Accountability Implications of Uses of Evidence
The creation of a second system of accountability external and parallel to 
the hierarchical structure of management of the Ghana health system 
could in theory be managed through the use of common tools for evalua-
tion, which might ensure the alignment and coordination between the 
two systems of accountability (and evaluation). However, the scores 
attributed to each target in the Holistic Assessment entails some political 
judgment of success and failure, raising questions of responsibility and 
authority to decide on these outcomes (Bovens et al. 2006). Having two 
accountability systems driven by different stakeholders thus can make it 
unclear to whom responsibility and liability issues should be referred.
The World Health Organizatoin’s description of Ministries of Health as 
having key ‘stewardship’ roles in country health decision making (World 
Health Organization 2000) could imply that the MoH is responsible for 
the health sector performance and should have overarching authority over 
relevant stakeholders, active in the health sector including NGOs, interna-
tional donors, health agencies, academics, health associations, etc. In prac-
tice this is not the case, as each stakeholder has its own power to influence 
the outcome of policy evaluation and, accordingly, influence or bypass 
accountability structures in place. The ability to do this, in turn, depends 
on the capacity of each stakeholder to use evidence as a tool for applying 
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its scrutiny to policy performances and defining its discretion in guiding 
future policy directions; hence, evidence appears as a powerful tool for 
stakeholders to negotiate their own position with respect to the other 
participants.
tEcHnIcal EvaluatIon and accountabIlIty 
mEcHanISmS
Indicators aim to ‘indicate’ (rather than prove) whether some program-
matic situation is still relevant to be considered within a certain policy per-
spective or whether new situations have emerged that affect policy 
trajectories. As in the case of Ghana, the HIMD has primarily the duty to 
‘fill’—rather than create—indicators, as indicators are generally established 
by international bodies such as the WHO; however, our interviews stated 
that some margin of discretion over data selection always exists, especially 
when data are lacking. Also, discretion exists in the very use of indicators to 
produce reports and draw political attention. So, for instance, one inter-
viewee indicated that the Director General of the GHS can request specific 
data or indicators that do not fall into the HSTMDP (GHS-1). The discre-
tion over data and indicators could also be seen in the way that particular 
pieces of data, or particular results of analysis, are promoted by bureaucrats 
within the HIMD to influence policymakers (GHS-1).
The discretion in filling indicators with data is not a problem per se, 
neither is selecting specific indicators to promote political awareness over 
certain issues; on the contrary, discretion is a typical characteristic of tech-
nical agencies supposed to simplify very complex situations and enhance 
the quality and pace of policy decisions. However, discretion raises ques-
tions if it is exclusively driven by bureaucracy, in the absence of political 
engagement to use information in a way that reflects political priorities. As 
a general consideration, this is a technical problem of managerial account-
ability relationships: in a typical principal-agent perspective, the ‘principal’ 
should guide the ‘agent’ in the implementation of policy objectives (Pratt 
and Zeckhauser 1991). In the case of Ghana, an additional concern relates 
to the fact that the production of indicators and the political values built 
into them will be used as a policy tool for negotiation (i.e., the Holistic 
Assessment tool) during the Health Summit. The holistic assessment of 
progress is indeed meant to be presented and discussed during the Health 
Summit and negotiated and agreed upon by the MoH and Partners at the 
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immediately subsequent business meeting in April (Ghana Health Sector 
2012, p. 20). Indeed, the outcome of the health sector assessment serves 
as the basis for discussing the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) 
for Multi-Donor Budget Support during the business meeting following 
the Health Summit (Ghana Health Sector 2012).6 Therefore, the CMA 
sets the framework for both constructing evidence—by specifying how the 
Holistic Assessment tool should be used—and deciding which evidence 
should be taken as relevant for future planning.
The case of Ghana shows that the use of evidence does not respond to 
a purely informative concern of enhancing the quality of decisions and 
anticipating the consequences of actions; it also responds to the need to 
justify decisions at the moment of the Health Summit, hence to negotiate 
the value of the actions that may follow (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
Further, the power of DP to influence the selection and evaluation of indi-
cators influences the outcome of the negotiating process and the setting of 
future policy directions. Indeed, the capacity that stakeholders have to 
influence each other’s views often reflects an adversarial process, in which 
the construction of policy meaning occurs through negotiation between 
competing views over policy performances and the subsequent judgments 
on future policy directions (Bovens et al. 2006). Evidence can be used to 
arbitrate such adversarial process, but at the same time, where disparity 
emerges as to the capacity to employ it, evidence can end up determining 
policy directions.
Excluding coercion, the power that each actor has to influence the pro-
cess in which policy value get shaped partly rests in the way accountability 
structures establish common rules for participation and value discussions. 
These rules, in turn, get operationalized by stakeholders through the 
selection, activation, and evaluation of policy evaluation tools (Pearce 
et al. 2014). And indeed these tools create the conditions for setting dif-
ferent types of public spaces of discussion while realistically admitting only 
those participants with the capacity to provide insights and feedback. For 
instance, one of our interviewees from the MoH complained about the 
superior technical capacity of DP to produce evidence of performances 
(GHS-1). This asymmetry is problematic in two respects: on the one 
hand, Ghanaian officials have little capacity to enter the technical discus-
sion, hence to raise issues of political relevance connected to them, due to 
a lack of counteracting arguments.
6 See supra note 6.
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On the other hand, the absence of clear problem setting and policy 
directions established by the MoH makes the discussion dominated by 
technical considerations of policy implementation performance. 
Interviewees from both DP and NGOs (DP-3 and LNGO-1) recognized 
such absence as problematic. In the wording of one representative of an 
international agency (DP-3), health policy in Ghana is only conceived in 
operational and strategic terms by the government and never in terms of 
policy objectives; accordingly, indicators are set only in the form of out-
comes (e.g., how many new hospitals have been built?) rather than impacts 
(e.g., how much child mortality has diminished?). On a different level, an 
NGO representative (LNGO-1) explained that the Ghana Coalition of 
NGOs in Health (http://www.ghanahealthngos.net/) has recently 
decided to challenge the government on health priorities by creating a 
concurrent space of advocacy and evidence use; the objective being to 
produce an alternative evidence-based report and submit it to the parlia-
ment select committee on health in order to influence health financing. 
However, it has been reported that the Parliament has very little power in 
influencing actual health policy outcomes (Ayee 2002) as some of our 
interviewees confirmed. It was explained, for instance, that the Parliament 
lacks the financial resources to /commission its own inquiries and studies, 
which could allow it to have greater say in the direction of health policy. 
This makes Parliament’s influence over domestic policy dependent on 
external aid provided directly to the legislature, for instance for organizing 
meetings with the civil society (DP-3, MEP-1 DP-1); at the same time, 
such dependence renders the Parliament practically impotent to have a say 
in the approval of sectoral budgets (Ayee 2002).
Therefore, evidence use in this policy space centres mainly on the use of 
common indicators, which might fail to link evaluation to ‘accountable’ 
(and potentially more democratic) decisions. The reason draws precisely 
on the duality of both evidence use and accountability relationships. In the 
first case, evidence use is both an informative and justificatory policy tool; 
in the second, accountability relationships envisage at the same time 
reporting on performances and policy achievements, and exposing perfor-
mances to some judgments and deliberation.
Evidence Use and Policy Value Judgements
As much as a practical investigation on the use of evidence in policy evalu-
ation has revealed the existence of structures of power, it has also revealed 
that policy evaluation is not only a technical process of assessment, but a 
E. VECCHIONE AND J. PARKHURST
 87
political process of value formation and judgment. In the case of Ghana, 
the health policymaking process sees the two typical phases of policy eval-
uation: (i) evidence synthesis and (ii) learning (i.e. evaluation and valua-
tion), disjointed into two separate spaces of accountability. One is 
structured around a decentralized structure of governance, whereas the 
other relies on the partnership between donors and the MoH. Whereas 
the use of evidence—inscribed in the Holistic Assessment tool—is in prin-
ciple envisaged in bringing these two spaces together, they remain sepa-
rated. This situation demonstrated that the relation between technical 
evaluation and political accountability is not always linear, nor can it be 
fixed by calls for more evidence use. Instead, looking at the systems of 
accountability in place along with the practices inscribed into them is cru-
cial to understand the democratic implications of evidence use. In con-
ducting policy evaluation, accountability relationships are important in 
that they help to set, or reconfigure, the power and influence between 
stakeholders and decision makers. Accountability is a quite elusive but 
powerful concept that, broadly speaking, indicates the range of respon-
siveness of policymakers to stakeholders’ interests and values. During—
and in contribution to—policy evaluation, interests and ideas of 
stakeholders become actionable through the way policy outcomes are 
assessed and policy directions are then selected or altered.
Further, by making political values exposed to public judgment and 
contestation (Heidelberg 2015), accountability goes beyond simplistic 
checks of stakeholders’ interests and enables a process of continuous 
reconstruction of political values. In this sense, accountability structures 
are important not only to shape authority relationships, but also to activate 
a social mechanism of participation in which the principles of an ideal rela-
tionship between those who govern and those who are governed (Bovens 
2010; Flinders 2011; Heidelberg 2015; Koppell 2005; Salminen and 
Lehto 2012) are continuously recreated each time they are ‘tested’ against 
legitimacy considerations (Rosanvallon 2011). In turn, the capacity to use 
knowledge and evidence becomes crucial to (re-)organize such principles 
through mechanisms of responsiveness and degrees of scrutiny over poli-
cymakers’ decisions; hence, crucial to operationalize accountability.
concluSIonS
In this chapter, we have explored the implications of the use of evidence 
for democratic decision making by looking at the accountability structures 
in Ghana. The Health Summit in Ghana revealed the importance of the 
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policy evaluation stage within the policymaking process for understanding 
the effects of the use of evidence in policymaking—in terms of how the use 
of data goes beyond technical measurement, and serves to establish politi-
cal judgements and affect policy choices. In this process, we found that use 
of evidence is a means through which power is exercised. Also, the use 
policy evaluation within the Health Summit reveals the role of evidence 
use in both informing and justifying decisions and its relevance for under-
standing how accountability relationships matter in structuring power 
relations. The structure of the accountability relationship, therefore, pro-
vides the basis for discussing issues of democratic decision making con-
nected to the use of evidence in policymaking. Indeed, the involvement of 
international donors, responsible for funding a significant amount of 
health services, can challenge national structures of authority and account-
ability that exist within the existing governance structure of the state.
International donors often champion the language of evidence based 
policymaking, while simultaneously embracing the language of good gov-
ernance and democratic representation in aid-recipient countries. As the 
case of Ghana has showed, however, it is important that donors involved 
in processes of evidence use to inform policy—either by extracting local 
data to generate their own assessments or in constructing indicators to 
serve as evaluation tools—consciously consider the potential implications 
these practices have over local accountability mechanisms along with pos-
sible legitimacy concerns. Data created to evaluate (or monitor the perfor-
mance of) a health sector’s functioning may often be described as purely 
technical tools. Yet when such data are used to inform policy and plan-
ning, they can have direct political implications, reflecting the political 
realities of decision making and planning structures in a country. As shown 
here, their use can create new accountability systems and thus raise ques-
tions over governance and influence over local policy decisions.
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